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WHAT IS A POLITICAL CONSTITUTION? 
 




The question—what is a political constitution?—might seem, at first blush, fairly innocuous. 
At one level, the idea of a political constitution seems fairly well settled, at least insofar as 
most political constitutionalists subscribe to a similar set of commitments, arguments and 
assumptions. At a second, more reflective level, however, there remains some doubt whether 
a political constitution purports to be a descriptive or normative account of a real world 
constitution, such as Britain’s. By exploring the idea of a political constitution as differently 
articulated by J.A.G. Griffith, Adam Tomkins and Richard Bellamy, this essay explores why 
the normativity of a political constitution may be indistinct and ill-defined, and how 
compelling reasons for this indistinctness and ill-definition are to be found in the very idea of 
a political constitution itself. A political constitution is here conceived as a ‘model’ which 
supplies an explanatory framework within which to make sense of our constitutional self-
understandings. The discipline of thinking in terms of a model opens up a critical space 
wherein there need not be some stark, all-encompassing choice between constitutional 
models, which, in turn, allows for more subtle understandings of Britain’s constitution as 
neither exclusively ‘political’ nor ‘legal’. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
To inquire ‘what is a political constitution?’ is to pose a beguilingly simple question. It is true, 
of course, that the idea of a political constitution—one that is associated with holding those 
who exercise political power to account, for the most part, through political processes and in 
political institutions—has long since melted into the landscape of constitutional thought, at 
least in Britain. It is commonplace, after all, for textbooks and articles to juxtapose the idea of 
a political constitution with that of a legal constitution, the latter being associated with holding 
those exercising political power to account, to a substantial and increasing extent, through 
judicial review. It is also commonplace to suggest that Britain’s constitution is slowly evolving 
away from a political constitution towards something more akin to a legal constitution. Yet, at 
the same time, our question—what is a political constitution?—is not so easily answered. For 
the question itself seems incomplete. As H.L.A. Hart remarked in 1953, ‘what is . . .’ questions 
‘have great ambiguity’ insofar as ‘the same form of words may be used to demand a definition 
or the cause or the purpose or the justification or the origin of a legal or political institution’.1 
Without more, the question is not situated in time, place, or perspective. To leave such matters 
unspecified neglects the potential for the political constitution to lend, explicitly or otherwise, 
something important to the constitutional self-understandings of a great variety of different 
people, in different places, at different times, and in different ways across the history of 
constitutional thought. Or, differently put: it is possible to pursue our question in any number 
of directions.  
                                                 
* Lecturer in Law, Birmingham Law School, University of Birmingham, email: G.D.S.Gee@bham.ac.uk. 
** Lecturer in Law, Department of Law, London School of Economics and Political Science, email: 
G.Webber@lse.ac.uk. We are grateful to our colleagues for generous comments on previous drafts. 
1 HLA Hart, ‘Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence’ [1953] in his Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy 
(OUP, New York 1983) 21.  
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Our answer to the question—what is a political constitution?—will seek to explain why 
the political constitution continues to bring something important to the constitutional self-
understandings of public lawyers in Britain at the very time when the British constitution is 
said to be evolving towards a legal constitution. This more focused question could be taken to 
invite an inquiry into the commitments, arguments and assumptions shared by most 
proponents of a political constitution; assumptions, for example, about the nature, content and 
workings of a real world constitution, such as Britain’s, or the proper role of political and 
judicial institutions therein. But this question could also invite a more reflective inquiry into 
what the idea of a political constitution purports to be; for example, does it purport to describe 
Britain’s constitution or to make normative sense of it? In this essay, we address our question 
in these more reflective terms, and for the following reasons. Today, the commitments, 
arguments and assumptions—in short, the claims—shared by most proponents of a political 
constitution seem fairly settled. In the thirty years since J.A.G. Griffith’s lecture on ‘The 
Political Constitution’,2 and from which point it seems reasonable to trace the modern 
development of political constitutionalist thought,3 the articulation of the claims that inform 
and underpin a political constitution has achieved a certain completeness—and amongst its 
proponents at least, a certain acceptability. The same is not true, however, of efforts to make 
sense of the political constitution at a more reflective level. In truth, there has been little 
reflection on what students of the British constitution imagine themselves as doing (or for that 
matter what they succeed in doing) when they appeal to, and talk in terms of, a political 
constitution.4  
 
More particularly, there remains some doubt whether proponents of a political 
constitution imagine themselves as engaged in a largely descriptive or normative enterprise, or 
perhaps an uncertain mix of the two. It is notable, for instance, that while Griffith spoke of 
British’s political constitution in largely descriptive terms, Adam Tomkins and Richard 
Bellamy have each more recently envisaged the idea of a political constitution in explicitly, 
self-consciously normative terms.5 Whereas Griffith seemed to deny normative content to the 
idea of a political constitution or, indeed, to deny the status of a political constitution as an 
idea at all, envisaging it instead as a reading of prevailing practices in the British political 
system, Tomkins and Bellamy have each argued that the idea of a political constitution can be 
conceived separately from any real world constitution as one that is informed and underpinned 
by republican norms. In this essay, we explore why some seem to envisage the idea of a 
political constitution in largely descriptive terms, yet others do so in plainly normative terms. 
In doing so, we consider whether there is something inherent in the very idea of a political 
constitution which invites, and possibly even demands, ambiguity about its precise normative 
                                                 
2 JAG Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 MLR 1-21. 
3 For a brief discussion of the development of something akin to the idea of a political constitution in the work of 
Harold Laski and Ivor Jennings, and the subsequent and explicit development of this idea by Griffith, see 
Michael Foley, The Politics of the British Constitution (Manchester University Press, Manchester 1999) 30-37. 
For some, the classic work on the idea of a political constitution is Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution 
[1867] (Collins, London 1963). See generally Martin Loughlin, Swords & Scales: An Examination of the 
Relationship of Law & Politics (Hart, Oxford 2000) 4; and Adam Tomkins, ‘The Republican Monarchy 
Revisited’ (2002) 19 Constitutional Commentary 737-760. 
4 Often appeals are made to ‘the political constitution’ and ‘a political constitution’, testifying to some ambiguity 
as to the ambition of those who talk and think in these terms. For now, we will generally employ the phrase, ‘the 
idea of a political constitution’ as a precursor to our claim, developed below, that a political constitution is best 
conceived as a model of the constitution. 
5 See Adam Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Hart, Oxford 2005); and Richard Bellamy, Political 
Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy (CUP, Cambridge 2007). 
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content. In short, ours is an attempt to grapple with the indistinct and ill-defined normativity of 
a political constitution.  
 
In doing so, we seek to respond to the challenge which, in our view, nowadays 
confronts proponents of a political constitution in Britain. If, on the one hand, a political 
constitution is no more than a predominantly descriptive account of constitutional practices, 
there is an argument that it no longer accurately describes—if it ever did—the nature, content 
and workings of the British constitution. If, on the other hand, a political constitution is a 
predominantly normative idea, there is an argument that it no longer supplies—if it ever did—
an attractive account upon which to organize the British constitution. In this essay, we explore 
why responses to this challenge must begin by recognizing that the normativity of a political 
constitution is indistinct and ill-defined, but that compelling reasons for this indistinctness and 
ill-definition can be found within the political constitution itself. In our view, only by 
grappling with its indistinct and ill-defined normativity will we be able to grasp what the idea 
of political constitution purports to be and, in turn, to understand its continued relevance to 
what many take to be Britain’s changing constitution. In doing so, we develop below the claim 
that a political constitution is best conceived as a constitutional model which oscillates 
between the descriptive and the normative.  
 
We approach our study of the political constitution in a more or less unorthodox 
fashion. For one of the distinguishing features of much political constitutionalist scholarship 
is the extent to which its proponents engage with legal constitutionalists, such as Ronald 
Dworkin, T.R.S. Allan and Sir John Laws, but not with each other.6 Indeed, it can sometimes 
seem as if, for many of its proponents, a political constitution is defined by the array of 
contrasts that can be drawn with a legal constitution, with much effort being made to rebut the 
challenges that appear to be posed to a political constitution by its legal counterpart. More 
emphasis tends to be placed on making sense of a political constitution obliquely, in terms of 
what it differs from, rather than in terms of its own possibilities. There may be good reasons 
for seeking to explain a political constitution (or any complex idea) in this way. It might even 
be difficult to make sense of the political constitution without, to some degree, bringing into 
perspective the idea of a legal constitution. In this essay, however, we engage more directly 
with the idea of a political constitution itself. Consequently we devote comparatively little 
attention to the nature, content and workings of a legal constitution.7 Instead, our focus is on 
the idea of a political constitution as it has been differently articulated over the last thirty 
years or so by Griffith, Tomkins and Bellamy. We begin by considering Professor Griffith’s 
lecture on ‘The Political Constitution’. This lecture expressed, albeit in ways that are 
exaggerated in places, the claims today shared by most proponents of a political constitution 
in Britain. More importantly for our purposes, Griffith’s lecture is interesting insofar as it 
seemed to envisage the political constitution in terms which were largely, if not at times 
exclusively, descriptive of prevailing constitutional arrangements.  
                                                 
6 While many proponents of a legal constitution draw on, or at least seem to be inspired by, the writings of 
Ronald Dworkin, the leading proponents in Britain of the model of a legal constitution are TRS Allan and John 
Laws: see TRS Allan, Law, Liberty and Justice: The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism (Clarendon, 
Oxford 1993); TRS Allan, Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (OUP, Oxford 2001); 
John Laws, ‘Law and Democracy’ [1995] PL 72-93; and John Laws, ‘The Constitution, Morals and Rights’ 
[1996] PL 622-635.  
7 For critiques of the legal constitutionalist approach, and particularly the work of TRS Allan, see Thomas Poole, 
‘Dogmatic Liberalism? T.R.S. Allan and the Common Law Constitution?’ (2002) 65 MLR 463-475; Thomas 
Poole ‘Back to the Future? Unearthing the Theory of Common Law Constitutionalism’ (2003) 23 OJLS 435-
454; and Thomas Poole, ‘Questioning Common Law Constitutionalism’ (2005) 25 LS 142-163.  
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2. The Descriptivism of Griffith’s Political Constitution 
 
Professor Griffith chose as the title for the Chorley Lecture of 1978, ‘The Political 
Constitution’,8 but in neither the lecture itself nor his writings more generally did Griffith 
purport to grapple with the question ‘what is a political constitution?’, perhaps because he 
never conceived of it as anything distinct or separate from the British constitution itself. 
Rather, Griffith’s contribution was to offer what was, in 1978, a novel account of Britain’s 
constitutional arrangements—and for some a faintly disturbing account—of what he took to 
be the distinctively political character of the constitution. Through this, Griffith lay the 
foundations for the emergence of the idea of a political constitution as a fresh and provocative 
way of thinking and talking about the British constitution. To be clear, the novelty of his 
lecture lay less in making claims not found in his previous scholarship or in describing the 
British constitution as distinctively political; rather, the novelty was in bringing claims (and 
aphorisms) present in his earlier scholarship together into a reading of the British constitution 
that was political inasmuch as it was characterized by conflict, disagreement, messiness, and 
chaos—a reading that was fresh, provocative, even unsettling for some. 
 
Griffith’s lecture set out the sort of relentless critique of a bill of rights which is today 
distinctive of much political constitutionalist scholarship. More particularly, Griffith’s lecture 
was a critique of bills of rights of the sort that generate judicially enforceable limits on the 
legislature.9 This critique relied on two broad categories of objection, which he labelled the 
‘philosophical’ and ‘political’.10 The philosophical objection reflected Griffith’s rejection of 
any approach to constitutional matters that was focused on, and formulated in terms of, 
‘rights’. For Griffith, there was no such thing as ‘rights’, but rather ‘political claims by 
individuals and groups’.11 There is, Griffith suggested, ‘a continuous struggle between the 
rulers and the ruled about the size and shape of these claims’, and that ‘struggle is political 
throughout’.12 This led Griffith to stress the importance of cultivating ‘situations in which 
groups of individuals may make their political claims and thus seek to persuade governments 
to accept them’.13 Griffith’s political objection reflected his belief that law is neither separate 
from nor superior to politics, but is itself a form of political discourse. ‘Law’, Griffith wrote, 
‘is not and cannot be a substitute for politics’.14 Therefore, insofar as politics is ‘what happens 
in the continuance or resolution of conflicts’, law is no more than ‘one means, one process, by 
which those conflicts are continued or may be temporarily resolved’.15 Or, as Griffith put it in 
a later article, ‘law is politics carried on by other means’.16  
                                                 
8 For three recent re-interpretations of this lecture, see Carol Harlow, ‘The Political Constitution Reworked’ in 
Rick Bigwood (ed), Public Interest Litigation: New Zealand Experience in International Perspective 
(LexisNexis, Wellington 2006) 189; Thomas Poole, ‘Tilting at Windmills? Truth and Illusion in the Political 
Constitution’ (2007) MLR 250-277; and Graham Gee, ‘The Political Constitutionalism of J.A.G. Griffith’ (2008) 
28 LS 20-45. 
9 Griffith presented the lecture as a response to three books published in the 1970s: Lord Hailsham, The Dilemma 
of Democracy: Diagnosis and Prescription (Collins, London 1978); Lord Scarman, English Law—The New 
Dimensions (Stevens, London 1974); and Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Duckworth, London 1977). 
10 See Griffith (n 2) at 12.  
11 Ibid 17. 
12 Ibid 17-18. 
13 Ibid 18. 
14 Ibid 16. 
15 Ibid 20. 
16 JAG Griffith, ‘The Common Law and the Political Constitution’ (2001) 117 LQR 42-67, 64. 
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Together, these two objections led Griffith to argue that bills of rights should be 
avoided. For Griffith, rights, and the principles that are said to find expression in them, cannot 
be guidelines for legislative or administrative activity since rights and principles, in their 
application to specific situations, are ‘the very questions which divide not unify opinion’.17 
The fact that the framers of bills of rights are ingenious in crafting abstract formulations under 
the rubric of rights should not conceal what are in truth political claims. It followed, for 
Griffith, that judicial adjudication of political claims passes ‘political decisions out of the 
hands of politicians and into the hands of judges’.18 Thus, bills of rights do not resolve 
political claims, but shift them into disputes about the meaning of the legal language of the 
bill of rights, with these disputes ultimately falling to be decided by judges. This, in turn, 
offended Griffith’s conviction that ‘political decisions should be taken by politicians’.19 From 
Griffith’s viewpoint, political decisions should be taken by politicians not because politicians 
are more likely to arrive at some uniquely correct answer, but because they are removable 
every few years at the ballot box and are accountable to Parliament in the meantime. This led 
Griffith to contend that ‘the responsibility and accountability of our rulers should be real and 
not fictitious’.20 While Griffith acknowledged that mechanisms of political accountability 
such as ministerial responsibility did not always operate as effectively as might be hoped, he 
maintained that ‘the remedies are political’,21 by which he meant that proposals for reform 
should focus not on a bill of rights which would limit Parliament’s ability to legislate, but on 
measures which would enhance Parliament’s ability to hold ministers, and others who 
exercise political power, to account.22  
 
In crafting this critique of bills of rights, and in linking this critique to Britain’s 
reliance on mechanisms of political accountability, Griffith outlined his reading of Britain’s 
constitutional arrangements as they are and should be. While he did not offer anything akin to 
a definition or summary of his use of the expression ‘political constitution’ and did not 
explicitly refer to the rubric of ‘a political constitution’ in the text of his lecture itself, it seems 
to us that there are four claims which combined to delineate Griffith’s reading of a political 
constitution; claims which today, more than thirty years on, tend to be repeated, albeit often 
with a greater degree of theoretical sophistication, by most political constitutionalists in 
Britain. First, there is no sharp distinction between law and politics.23 Second, law and 
politics each respond to and are conditioned by ‘the conflict [which] is at the heart of modern 
society’.24 Law and politics are to be understood by reference to what Jeremy Waldron has 
termed ‘the circumstances of politics’, being ‘a felt need among the members of a certain 
group for a common framework or decision or course of action on some matter, even in the 
                                                 
17 Griffith (n 2) 20. For an argument how bills of rights can be read to acknowledge this, see Grégoire C N 
Webber, The Negotiable Constitution: On the Limitation of Rights (CUP, Cambridge 2009). 
18 Griffith (n 2) 16.  
19 Ibid 3 and 16.  
20 Ibid 16. 
21 Ibid 16. 
22 See generally JAG Griffith, Parliamentary Scrutiny of Government Bills (Allen & Unwin, London 1974). 
23 On the important contribution made by Griffith in claiming, albeit in stark terms, that law is politics by some 
other means, see Thérèse Murphy and Noel Whitty, ‘A Question of Definition: Feminist Legal Scholarship: 
Socio-Legal Studies and Debate about Law and Politics’ (2006) 57 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 539-56, 
539-540. For evidence that political constitutionalists have today moved beyond the starkness of Griffith’s claim 
to recognize that law and politics likely ‘collide and combine in a dazzling variety of (not always compatible) 
ways’: see, eg, Adam Tomkins, ‘In Defence of the Political Constitution’ (2002) 22 OJLS 157-75, 169. 
24 Griffith (n 2) 2. 
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face of disagreement about what that framework, decision or action should be’.25 Third, 
because of the circumstances of politics, reasoning under the rubric of ‘rights’ should be 
employed with caution, since there will likely be disagreement about which so-called ‘rights’ 
to recognize, how ‘rights’ apply to concrete cases, how best to realize such ‘rights’ and so 
forth. More pointedly put: arguments about what are contestable, political claims should be 
recognized and labelled as such rather than paraded about as ‘rights’. Fourth, this account of 
the relation between law and politics, together with a profound scepticism about rights-based 
reasoning, ‘cannot encourage those who would embark on formal or written statements’ such 
as a bill of rights to limit the political process, but suggests instead that ‘the best [that] we can 
do is enlarge the areas for argument and discussion’26 in the political process, including about 
the nature and content of the constitution itself. Together, these four claims combined to map 
Griffith’s reading of Britain’s constitution as one which treats the constitution not as a 
framework of fundamental laws, but as a contingent response to the circumstances of politics 
that is itself the subject of political debate, as well as liable to the possibility of change, even 
radical change, through the ordinary, day-to-day political process. 
 
Griffith’s reading of Britain’s constitutional arrangements as political through-and-
through has found a sympathetic audience with modern day proponents of the political 
constitution. It seems that for some, however, this sympathy has been tested by the 
descriptivism (or, as we put it below, the apparent descriptivism) of Griffith’s political 
constitution.27 Despite Griffith’s not infrequent appeal to the vocabulary of ‘ought’ (e.g., 
‘political decisions should be taken by politicians’, ‘the responsibility and accountability of 
our rulers should be real and not fictitious’), some take his reading of Britain’s constitution in 
1979 to deny that there are norms underpinning a political constitution, and, as a 
consequence, no prescriptions deriving from it to guide the behaviour of ministers, members 
of Parliament, civil servants, law officers, judges and so forth.28 This apparent descriptivism 
is encapsulated in a passage in which Griffith wrote that Britain’s constitution ‘lives on, 
changing from day to day for the constitution is no more and no less than what happens. 
Everything that happens is constitutional. And if nothing happened that would be 
constitutional also’.29 On one reading, this passage implies that there can be no norms 
underpinning a political constitution inasmuch as a political constitution always remains 
subject to the possibility of change—significantly, any change—through the ordinary political 
process. On this reading, in which there are no legal limits on the political process and no bill 
of rights to cabin day-to-day politics, everything and anything that happens is constitutional.  
 
                                                 
25 Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (OUP, Oxford 1999) 102.  
26 Griffith (n 2) 20. 
27 For brief discussion of the ‘descriptivism’ of Griffith’s model of a political constitution, see Dawn Oliver, 
Constitutional Reform in the UK (OUP, Oxford 2003) 21 (characterizing Griffith’s idea of a political constitution 
as ‘lacking normative content’); and JWF Allison, The English Historical Constitution: Continuity, Change and 
European Effects (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 34 (characterizing Griffith’s political constitution as ‘entirely 
descriptive—neither legally prescriptive nor morally normative’). 
28 It would follow that, for Griffith, something like ministerial responsibility, which is a key component of most 
understandings of a political constitution, is not a constitutional requirement, but simply a prevailing practice in 
Britain’s political constitution. If ministers refused to inform and explain their actions to Parliament, it would not 
be apt, on this reading of Griffith’s lecture, to talk of ‘unconstitutionality’, but rather to conclude that Britain’s 
political constitution, which can of course be changed through the ordinary political process, would have simply 
‘changed again’: JAG Griffith, ‘Comment’ [1963] PL 401-403, 402. According to this reading, it is not possible 
to argue that something in Britain’s political constitution is ‘unconstitutional’, only that it is ‘politically unwise 
or undesirable’: JAG Griffith, ‘The Brave New World of Sir John Laws’ (2000) 63 MLR 159-76, 175. 
29 Griffith (n 2) 19. 
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On a second (and, in our view, truer) reading, matters are rather more ambiguous. We 
concede that Griffith appeared to deny normative content to a political constitution; indeed, 
that he can be taken to deny that the political constitution can be conceived of as an ‘idea’ 
separable from Britain’s constitution. We also concede that one possible consequence of 
Griffith’s failure to emphasize any normative content to the political constitution is that 
Britain’s seeming shift towards the idea of a legal constitution could ‘be presented as 
jeopardizing nothing that is normatively valuable’.30 At the same time, however, it is difficult 
to escape the conclusion that, for Griffith, Britain’s political constitution exemplified a ‘good’ 
constitution and to which normative weight ought to be attached. As Carol Harlow observes, 
Griffith’s political constitution stands ‘as a benchmark for those who see representative and 
parliamentary government as important constitutional desiderata’.31 Indeed, perhaps above 
all, Griffith’s lecture stands as a benchmark for those who recognize a critical, normatively 
significant link between the constitution and political activity, and where the constitution 
always remains subject to the possibility of change through the sort of day-to-day politics 
which is associated with representative and parliamentary government. It may be, then, that 
Griffith’s quip that Britain’s constitution is no more and no less than what happens was 
merely a reminder, in aphoristic form, that a constitution should always be subject to political 
debate in, and the possibility of change through, the ordinary political process. If Griffith can 
be taken as sketching his vision of a ‘good’ constitution—or in terms that might be truer to his 
approach: as presenting the British constitution in a way that brings out its best components—
and if his suggestion that a constitution is no more and no less than what happens is taken as a 
statement about the close relationship between a political constitution and day-to-day politics, 
Griffith can be said to have downplayed, but not denied, the normativity within—indeed, the 
separable idea of—the political constitution.32 We return to this below. For now, we suggest 
that if this reading is correct, the challenge for political constitutionalists would seem to be 
two-fold: first, to render explicit the normative content of a political constitution; and second, 
to account for why this normative content remained indistinct and ill-defined within Griffith’s 
lecture. The first of these challenges is, it now seems, being met: for in an attempt to move 
beyond the apparent descriptivism associated with Griffith’s political constitution, and in 
order to render explicit what would be lost with any shift towards a legal constitution, recent 
scholarship on the idea of a political constitution has taken an explicitly ‘normative turn’.  
 
3.   A Normative Turn 
 
The turn evident in recent political constitutionalist scholarship renders explicit the normative 
qualities of day-to-day politics in real world constitutions, such as Britain’s, with long 
traditions of democracy and the rule of law. This ‘turn’—spearheaded by public lawyer Adam 
Tomkins and political theorist Richard Bellamy—supplies a corrective to the vision of day-to-
day politics commonly associated with legal constitutionalists, who often seem to cabin 
politics for fear of its destructive potential. Legal constitutionalists sometimes present the 
vagaries of ordinary, everyday political life as potentially destructive of the rule of law and 
individual rights and which, therefore, must be constrained by judicially enforceable 
                                                 
30 Tomkins (n 5) at 40. 
31 Harlow (n 8) 190. 
32 Griffith (n 2) 15 (Griffith referred to reform proposals which ‘would change the constitution at its very heart. 
This heart is that the Governments of the United Kingdom may take any action necessary for the proper 
government of the United Kingdom, as they see it, subject to two limitations. The first limitation is that they may 
not infringe the legal rights of others unless expressly authorized to do so under statute or the prerogative. The 
second limitation is that if they wish to change the law, whether by adding to their existing legal powers or 
otherwise, they must obtain the assent of Parliament’). 
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constitutional prescriptions. Instead, the normative turn in political constitutionalist writing 
offers an account of how politics serves as the ‘vehicle’33 through which to realize these same 
(and other) ends. More particularly, the very aspects of day-to-day political life that ‘many 
legal and political theorists are apt to denigrate—its adversarial and competitive qualities, its 
use of compromise and majority rule to generate agreement, the role of political parties—are 
those’ that political constitutionalists like Bellamy and Tomkins ‘seek to praise’.34 In doing 
so, the focus of this turn is not on an idealized form of political life, but rather—much like 
Griffith—on the actual day-to-day political life found in real world constitutions, with all of 
its imperfections and foibles. In what follows, we offer a sketch of the broad contours of this 
recent scholarship in order to show how political constitutionalists have sought both to move 
beyond the descriptivism associated with Griffith’s reading of a political constitution and to 
elaborate on the link which Griffith alluded to between the constitution and day-to-day 
politics.  
 
Sympathetic to the tenor of Griffith’s commitment to political accountability, but 
critical of his descriptive account, Tomkins has sought ‘not to invent but to revive’ the idea of 
a political constitution by grounding it on basic norms of republican theory.35 Drawing on the 
scholarship of Quentin Skinner and Philip Pettit, Tomkins has identified non-domination, 
popular sovereignty, equality, open government and civic virtue as the basic norms that 
inform and underpin the idea of a political constitution.36 Extrapolating from these basic 
norms to consider how republicanism might be instantiated in a real world constitution, 
Tomkins has suggested that ‘the centrepiece of a republican constitutional structure is 
accountability: those in positions of political power must be accountable to those over whom 
(and in whose name) such power is exercised’.37 This, in turn, has prompted Tomkins to 
argue that a political constitution, with its emphasis on political accountability, embraces 
elements of a republican ideal. By pointing to ministerial responsibility as the ‘simple—and 
beautiful—rule’38 that resides at the heart of Britain’s constitutional arrangements, Tomkins 
has constructed a republican-inspired reading of what is, for him, Britain’s political 
constitution. For the most part, Tomkins—in a manner that recalls Griffith’s approach—
draws out the primarily political character of the British constitution by interpreting 
contemporary constitutional practices in ways that illuminate the continued relevance of 
ministerial responsibility. In the face of the widespread belief that Parliament is seldom 
effective in holding ministers to account, Tomkins re-appraises the parliamentary record, 
arguing that although ministerial responsibility is not always as effective as might be hoped, 
‘the system of political accountability is actually stronger now than it has been for some 
years’.39 
 
                                                 
33 Tomkins (n 5) 3. 
34 Bellamy (n 5) 210. 
35 Tomkins (n 5) vii.  
36 See generally Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism (CUP, Cambridge 1998); Philip Pettit, 
Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (OUP, Oxford 1997); and Philip Pettit, ‘Keeping 
Republican Freedom Simple: On a Difference with Quentin Skinner’ (2002) 30 Political Theory 339. 
37 Tomkins (n 5) 64-65.  
38 Ibid 1. 
39 Adam Tomkins, Public Law (Clarendon, Oxford 2003) 134. By stressing the continued relevance of 
ministerial responsibility, he suggests that the constitution, in the absence of fundamental laws that are 
enforceable in the courts, is premised upon political accountability, and upon a political class which takes 
seriously its responsibility for holding ministers to account. See further Adam Tomkins, The Constitution after 
Scott: Government Unwrapped (Clarendon, Oxford 1998) 266-75. 
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This republican-inspired account has attracted considerable comment, albeit much of 
it critical.40 For our purposes, however, what is significant about Tomkins’ scholarship is that 
it bespeaks a concern to move beyond Griffith’s descriptivism in order to construct a 
normatively attractive vision of a political constitution that explains how day-to-day political 
activity, and the exercise of ministerial responsibility in particular, helps to realize the basic 
norms of republicanism.  
 
Like Tomkins, Richard Bellamy has drawn upon republican theory to develop an 
explicitly normative account of the idea of a political constitution.41 Yet, unlike Tomkins, for 
whom ministerial responsibility to Parliament is the core of a political constitution, the 
legislature’s law-making function is the thread that runs throughout Bellamy’s designation of 
the political constitution as the democratic constitution. This emphasizes not only the politics 
of prevailing constitutional arrangements—the constitution as the contingent, contested result 
of reasonable disagreement operating under the circumstances of politics, where 
constitutional change is effected for the most part through the prevailing political majority—
but also the grounding of the constitution in the democratic. For Bellamy, ‘the democratic 
process is the constitution’.42 On this account, the constitution never escapes democracy, 
insofar as it is never beyond question or amendment by the principal political institutions, 
acting through ordinary political (and, for the most part, legislative) processes. The 
constitution is sustained (not undermined) by the day-to-day activity of democratic politics—
and, in this, is forever subject to modification and amendment through such political activity. 
The constitution is forever within the legislature’s grasp and forever subject to challenge, 
revision, amendment and—conceivably—rejection.  
 
For Bellamy, no political matter may be decided other than by the people, lest that 
matter (no matter how obvious or true or right) become a source of domination over the 
people. This confronts the view of legal constitutionalists, according to which certain matters 
are not—or, once positioned at the constitutional level, are no longer—political. For some 
legal constitutionalists, certain ‘constitutionalized’ matters are beyond recall or question by 
political institutions through the normal political processes; they exist within a non-political 
world. But this stratagem is nothing other than politics cloaked in false neutrality, Bellamy 
                                                 
40 For the criticism that Tomkins is selective in his use of historic materials to draw out what he takes to be the 
distinctive republican streak in Britain, see Martin Loughlin, ‘Towards a Republican Revival’ (2006) 26 OJLS 
425-37, 430-433. For the criticism that Tomkins neglects important facets of Philip Pettit’s republican ideal, 
including Pettit’s caution about the limitations of a ‘parliamentarian mentality’, see TRS Allan, ‘Book Review’ 
[2006] PL 172-175, 174. For criticism directed as much towards the very idea of a political constitution as 
towards Tomkins’ republican-inspired vision of a political constitution, see Ian Loveland, ‘Book Review’ (2006) 
122 LQR 340-344. For a more favourable review acknowledging that Tomkins attempted no more than a 
tentative and preliminary republican reading of the British constitution, see Danny Nicol, ‘Book Review’ (2006) 
69 MLR 280-84. 
41 See, eg, Bellamy (n 5). For critical reviews of Bellamy’s monograph, see TRS Allan, ‘Book Review’ (2008) 
67 CLJ 423-26; Lars Vinx, ‘Republicanism and Judicial Review’ (2009) 59 UTLJ 591-97; and Alec Walen, 
‘Judicial review in review: A four-part defence of legal constitutionalism—A review essay on Political 
Constitutionalism, by Richard Bellamy (2009) 7 I-CON 329-54. Themes consolidated in Bellamy’s monograph 
can be found in: Richard Bellamy, ‘The Political Form of the Constitution: The Separation of Powers, Rights 
and Representative Democracy’ (1996) XLIV Pol Studies 436-56; Richard Bellamy and Dario Castiglione, 
‘Constitutionalism and Democracy—Political Theory and the American Constitution’ (1997) 27 B J Pol Sci 595-
618; Richard Bellamy, ‘Constitutive Citizenship versus Constitutional Rights: Republican Reflections on the EU 
Charter and the Human Rights Act’ in Tom Campbell, KD Ewing and Adam Tomkins (eds), Sceptical Essays on 
Human Rights (OUP, Oxford 2001) 15; and Richard Bellamy, ‘Republicanism and Constitutionalism’ in Cécile 
Laborde and John Maynor (eds.), Republicanism and Political Theory (Blackwell, Oxford 2008).  
42 Bellamy (n 5) 5 (emphasis in original). 
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suggests, for nothing can be taken ‘outside of politics’, lest constraints be arbitrarily set upon 
the political system. It seems that from Bellamy’s standpoint, there is no non-political world, 
no matter that should be taken from the people and determined by some authority other than 
their own. The republican norm of non-domination requires that only the people rule 
themselves.   
 
Like Tomkins’, Bellamy’s account of a political constitution evinces the critical 
relationship between the constitution and ordinary day-to-day politics, even if they develop 
the political constitutionalist’s claims differently. These differences are explainable, in part, 
by the ‘purpose’ of a constitution attributed by each, and the role of Parliament within it. 
Tomkins talks of a constitution as being ‘to check government’.43 If this aptly captures his 
vision of a constitution, there is little surprise that he should underline the central importance 
of ministerial responsibility to Parliament and, in turn, that his concern should be with the 
influence of party whips and the need for more free votes in Parliament.44 Indeed, Tomkins 
has gone further in articulating his vision of a political constitution, arguing that ‘we should 
abandon the notion that Parliament is principally a legislator’; rather, today, Parliament is first 
and foremost a ‘scrutiner’ or ‘regulator’ of government.45 Meanwhile, Bellamy’s 
understanding of a constitution seems implicitly to emphasize not just a ‘negative’ red-light 
constitutionalism, in which the prime concern is to check government, but also a ‘positive’ 
constitutionalism in which political institutions and processes, and the legislative process 
more particularly, help to realize constitutional goods, including political equality. Bellamy’s 
idea of a political constitution is one which recognizes that a legislature premised upon 
majority rule, periodic elections and party competition will ‘institutionalize mechanisms of 
political balance and political accountability that provide incentives for politicians to attend to 
the judgments and interests of those they govern’.46 The thrust of Bellamy’s argument is that 
competition between political parties ‘reinforces [a system of political equality] by promoting 
the responsiveness of political agents to their citizen principals’.47  
 
While Tomkins and Bellamy have, for the most part, carried the normative turn in 
political constitutionalist scholarship, a survey of this turn would be incomplete if it omitted 
reference to Martin Loughlin.48 For although Loughlin has not identified himself as a 
participant in the political constitutionalist debate and, indeed, has expressly disassociated 
himself from the rubric of a political constitution,49 political constitutionalists have found 
much to support their thinking in Loughlin’s scholarship on the relationship between public 
law and politics. The disagreement that animates citizens, the contestability of political 
decisions, and the idea of law being a distinctive form of political discourse all animate 
Loughlin’s scholarship as they do political constitutionalist thought. Yet, when Loughlin turns 
directly to the idea of a political constitution, he conceives of it as ‘concerned with drawing a 
                                                 
43 Tomkins (n 5) 3. 
44 Ibid 136-139. For an illuminating exchange on the place of party whips in the British constitution, see Danny 
Nicol, ‘Professor Tomkins’s House of Mavericks’ [2006] PL 467-475; and Adam Tomkins, ‘Professor 
Tomkins’s House of Mavericks: A Reply’ [2007] PL 33-39. 
45 Adam Tomkins, ‘What is Parliament for?’ in Nicholas Bamforth and Peter Leyland (eds), Public Law in a 
Multi-Layered Constitution (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2003) 53, 54. 
46 Bellamy (n 5) viii. 
47 Ibid 259.  
48 See, in particular, Loughlin (n 3); and Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (OUP, Oxford 2003). 
49 See Martin Loughlin, ‘Reflections on the Idea of Public Law’ in Emilios Christodoulidis and Stephen Tierney 
(eds), Public Law and Politics: The Scope and Limits of Constitutionalism (Ashgate, Aldershot 2008) 52. 
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polarized opposition’ with the idea of a legal constitution.50 While he is correct to identify 
polarizing opposition between many political and legal constitutionalists, there remains an 
important explanatory force within the ideas of the political and legal constitution, as we will 
explore in the sections below. Nevertheless, while not participating directly in the normative 
turn described in this section, Loughlin has undoubtedly shaped the normative bases upon 
which this turn relies.51 
 
The normative turn within political constitutionalist scholarship has answered the first 
of two challenges that arise as a result Griffith’s downplaying of (but not denying the) 
normative content within a political constitution. While many might take issue with the 
normative qualities attributed to various aspects of day-to-day politics, Bellamy and Tomkins 
succeed in rendering explicit the normativity of a political constitution. But a second, related 
challenge remains: to account for why this normative content remained for Griffith and, we 
suggest, remains for Tomkins and Bellamy, indistinct and ill-defined. In other words, what is 
it about a political constitution that invites, and possibly even demands, ambiguity about its 
precise normative content? That is the task to which we now turn. 
 
4.  Prescriptive without Prescribing 
 
In our view, both a political constitution and a legal constitution are prescriptive, but not only 
do they make different demands of different political and judicial actors, they do so in more 
and less exacting ways. The prescriptions of a legal constitution are the more extensive and 
exacting, and thereby also the easier to detect. Typically, the idea of a legal constitution is 
associated with a constitutional text and a set of unwritten (judicially expounded) 
constitutional principles. The constitution is higher law, in the sense that ‘ordinary’ law 
conflicting with it is liable to be held invalid in the judicial process. What bears emphasis is 
that a legal constitution provides detailed and strong prescriptions as to the basic character, 
content and workings of the constitution, including, for example, prescriptions on which 
rights to include in a written bill of rights and on which grounds to exercise judicial review. 
Formalized legal instruments, such as a written constitution and a bill of rights, occupy much 
of the terrain populated by political actors, serving to bound political activity, including by 
prescribing procedures limiting the ability of political actors to change the constitution 
through the regular legislative process. Transgressions of the prescriptions laid down by a 
legal constitution are (said to be) easily identified, with judges pronouncing definitively on 
the requirements of formalized constitutional arrangements.  
 
In contrast, a political constitution offers no comparable, definitive prescriptions: no 
formalized legal instruments, no immutable statement of rights or architectural arrangements, 
no procedures entrenching the constitution, and no fixed constitutional boundaries to be 
policed. As a result, the idea of a political constitution continues to give rise to some 
ambiguity as to how it can be prescriptive in the absence of similarly overt prescriptions. The 
normative content of a political constitution is, in other words, difficult to discern. It is 
notable that just as the normative content of a political constitution is difficult to discern, so 
too are the very workings of a political constitution. Indeed, it occurs to us that a contributing 
factor to why the normativity of a political constitution remains obscured is because the 
workings of the political constitution are themselves less visible than a legal constitution. 
                                                 
50 Ibid 
51 For eg, Loughlin’s critical review of Rawls’ political liberalism will readily resonate with political 
constitutionalists: see Martin Loughlin, ‘Constitutional Theory: A 25th Anniversary Essay’ (2005) 25 OJLS 183-
202, 187-191. 
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Because a political constitution ‘lives on changing from day to day’ (as Griffith noted), and 
because, in a very real sense, ‘the democratic process is the constitution’ (as Bellamy noted), 
a political constitution is, in the final analysis, difficult to identify as a phenomenon distinct 
from day-to-day political activity. There is no appeal to a reified constitutional text, to a bill 
of rights or to grand judicial pronouncements. Rather, a political constitution works primarily, 
and often imperceptibly, inside Parliament and the executive and, where visible, its workings 
will often appear less dignified and more haphazard than court proceedings, as members of 
Parliament argue amongst each other, harangue the Prime Minister and then, for the most 
part, rally behind their party whips. In our view, this (in)visibility offers a partial explanation 
for why support for the idea of a political constitution seems to be dwindling: much of the 
workings of a political constitution are not visible, and where they are, they often take the 
form of the rough and tumble of day-to-day politics that ‘offend most of our rational and all 
of our artistic sensibilities’.52 
 
While it is true that the prescriptions of a legal constitution are more extensive and 
exacting than those of a political constitution—which explains, in part, why the normativity 
of a legal constitution is the easier to detect—it would be wrong to conclude from this alone 
that the normativity of a legal constitution is more compelling than that of its political 
counterpart. In the same way that it would be wrong to evaluate the quality of reasoning 
within a legislative forum against the standards of reasoning within a judicial forum, so too 
we should not expect a political constitution to exhibit the same species of normativity 
discernible within a legal constitution. Indeed, if we are willing to envisage the normativity of 
a constitution otherwise than a legal constitutionalist would, we might come to appreciate that 
there is something inherent in the idea of a political constitution that invites some necessary 
(and welcome) ambiguity about the extent to which a political constitution—which is always 
subject to the possibility of change through the political process—is prescriptive.  
 
The idea of a political constitution is prescriptive, but it does not purport to prescribe 
the nature and content of the constitution in great detail. By design, a political constitution 
leaves it to political actors, operating through the ordinary political process, to prescribe the 
nature and content of the constitution. At its simplest, it directs political actors to design an 
electoral process based on some notion of equal votes and to ensure that the political process 
is based on some notion of holding those in power to account. In this, the idea of a political 
constitution prescribes no more than the bare minimal conditions for political equality and 
accountability and non-domination. Beyond these broad parameters, there are ‘no views of 
democratic procedures that all can agree best protect majority rule, guarantee free discussion 
or protect minorities’.53 And because of this, no more prescriptions—in number or detail—
should be undertaken by anyone other than political actors. A political constitution does not 
prescribe in any great detail because one of its basic features is its constant liability to the 
possibility of change effected through the ordinary political process. It would not be coherent 
for the idea of a political constitution to prescribe that the nature and content of the 
constitution must always remain liable to change through the ordinary political process and 
yet also, at the same time, to prescribe that very nature and content.  
 
The significance of this becomes apparent if we contrast the role of political actors 
within the legal constitution and political constitution, respectively. The idea of a legal 
                                                 
52 Michael Oakeshott, The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism (Yale University Press, New Haven 
1996) 19. 
53 Bellamy (n 5) 134. 
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constitution presents the constitution as a fixed, end-point for political actors. Now, it is true 
that a legal constitution is not necessarily fixed in the sense that it is unchanging, at least 
insofar as it is subject to ‘growth’ under the guise of ‘living tree’ interpretation in the judicial 
forum or the evolution of ‘unwritten principles’ at common law. However, a legal constitution 
is, in effect, a fixed, end-point for political actors insofar as constraints are imposed upon 
(and, for the most part, are not amendable by) those actors. In contrast, the idea of a political 
constitution conceives of a constitution as more contingent, dynamic and political activity. It 
is appropriate to recall Griffith’s characterization of a political constitution as one in which 
‘[e]verything that happens is constitutional’, and where ‘if nothing happened that would be 
constitutional also’. As we read this famous passage, Griffith’s implication is that a political 
constitution is a direct expression of day-to-day political activity. Absent a set of fundamental 
laws, justiciable and enforceable in the courts, that impose restraints on political institutions 
and the political process more generally, a political constitution is conceived as a direct 
expression of ordinary political activity operating within and across political institutions. 
Critically, a political constitution is conceived in a way that makes explicit the possibility of 
adaptation, and even radical adaptation, through such ordinary, day-to-day political activity.  
 
In a sentence that aptly captures this less exacting, but nonetheless normative 
orientation, Bellamy writes that the constitution ‘must be left open so we may rebuild the ship 
at sea—employing, as we must, the prevailing procedures to renew and reform those self-
same procedures’.54 For Bellamy, and for political constitutionalists more generally, the ship 
of state is rebuilt according to the ordinary political process that is––so to speak––already at 
sea. In other words, the constitution and the political process which gives it shape are both 
already constituted. We, political actors and citizens, are not in the scholar’s ‘original 
position’ charged with designing a first constitution from naught. Rather, we are already at 
sea; a constitution is already before us, the political process already in use, and the process of 
rebuilding is, simply put, continual. For a political constitution, there is thus no single, 
identifiable moment of constitution-making and, for the political constitutionalist, it is right 
that this should be so. Because disagreement will never cease and because changing 
circumstances will likely affect people’s reasoned opinions, constitution-making should be 
seen as ‘an ongoing political process’ in the circumstances of politics.55 In this way, the idea 
of a political constitution encourages us to see (and to design) a constitution as created, 
sustained and amended through the ordinary political process that is the focus of day-to-day 
politics. It is thus that we might say that the idea of a political constitution is one that is 
prescriptive without really prescribing. Or rather: the idea of a political constitution prescribes 
that is for us all, for the most part acting through representatives in political institutions, to do 
the prescribing. 
 
Keeping all this in mind, we can see that the ambiguity that has so troubled 
interpretations of Griffith’s political constitution as normatively empty may be the inevitable 
ambiguity of any account of a constitution which purports to be prescriptive without 
prescribing much. The normativity of a political constitution is necessarily ambiguous 
because its ought-propositions are minimal; it directs, in effect, little more than that it is for all 
of us, acting principally through our elected representatives in Parliament, to do the 
prescribing. Of course, there is a deeper concern here, for some at least. Some will worry that 
a constitution that prescribes so little allows political actors too much latitude; too much room 
to ride roughshod over the rights of minorities or to disregard important boundaries of 
                                                 
54 Ibid 174 (emphasis added). 
55 Ibid 106. 
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constitutional government. There is, in other words, a real concern that a constitution should 
not be one where everything that happens, no matter the nature or content, is constitutional.  
 
To this political constitutionalists might respond: ‘whilst everything that happens is 
constitutional, not just anything can happen’.56 There are two claims wrapped within this 
response: empirical and normative. By laying stress on ‘real democracy’, ‘real politics’ and 
‘actually existing political practices’, political constitutionalists have rightly insisted on the 
empirical claim that a political institution that can do anything, in the sense of there being no 
legal limits on its powers, seldom actually does everything within its grasp. Rather, as 
political constitutionalists are keen to demonstrate, politics, unconstrained by judicially 
enforceable legal limits, can be used as the means to realize good ends. As we saw in the 
previous section, for Tomkins, this involves placing stress on the exercise of ministerial 
responsibility to Parliament as a way of checking the power of government; for Bellamy, this 
involves placing stress on how, far from endangering the rule of law and individual rights, 
Parliament’s law-making function supplies much of their rationale and best defence.  
 
Building on this empirical claim, political constitutionalists also make a normative 
claim. By specifying that not just anything can happen, political constitutionalists can be 
taken to claim that not just anything should happen. Or, more strongly put: certain things, 
albeit minimal, should happen. As just reviewed, the idea of a political constitution provides 
political actors with the directive: design a constitution that provides for the equal 
participation of all citizens, but, at the same time, ensure that this design is itself subject to the 
possibility of re-design. Fail in this task and the result will be a distancing from the republican 
ideal and a concomitant source of domination and political inequality. The result will not, 
however, be ‘invalid’ or contrary to fundamental law, as legal constitutionalists would 
maintain in relation to their more exacting prescriptions. The political constitution’s directive 
is prescriptive but not binding in the way of a legal constitution. 
 
Our claim, then, is that both a political constitution and a legal constitution share the 
normativity of an account that makes claims of political and judicial actors, even if they make 
different claims of each. However, where the species of normativity diverge is in the degree to 
which they prescribe. Legal constitutionalists prefer to set the stage before the actors step in 
and to determine their script to the greatest detail. In contrast, by self-consciously directing 
political actors to conceive of themselves as engaging in constitutional activity at the same 
time as they are engaged in ordinary, day-to-day political activity, political constitutionalists 
prescribe very little beyond the basic command to leave to political actors the responsibility to 
prescribe (and re-prescribe) the content and character of their constitution. The species of 
normativity inhabiting a political constitution thus escapes reification but, at times, also 
escapes obvious identification and classification. Yet, despite the relative indistinctness and 
ill-definition of its prescriptions, whenever one talks in terms of a political constitution, one 
must not lose sight of the fact that one appeals to a normative model of the constitution. Now, 
it is of course true that this model envisages a constitution that is contingent, contested, and 
even often times messy—but what recognizing a political constitution as a normative model 
helps us to grasp is that a political constitution is none the worse for it. For, at its best, a 
political constitution reflects the maturity, seriousness and responsibility of our political 
actors. And even at their worst, which is to say, for some political actors at least, much of the 
time, a political constitution still supplies a normatively attractive account of how we ought to 
govern ourselves. 
                                                 
56 Gee (n 8) 42 (emphasis in original). 
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5.  The Model of a Political Constitution 
 
We are now in a position to venture an answer to the question posed—what is a political 
constitution? In our view, a political constitution, conceived in reflective terms, is a normative 
model. We have, thus far, concentrated on making sense of the normativity of this model; that 
is to say, we have sought to show that what is distinctive about the normativity of a political 
constitution is that it is prescriptive without prescribing much. In this section, our attention 
shifts to what it means to talk of a political constitution as a model. While some political 
constitutionalists talk in terms of models,57 none has sought to explain the significance of this 
designation. This is unfortunate. To answer the question—what is a political constitution?—
we seek not only to offer an account of the normativity of a political constitution, but also to 
explain what it means to talk in terms of constitutional models. 
 
A model supplies an explanatory framework within which to make sense of a real 
world constitution. Because real world constitutions tend to be complex and contingent, and 
because our grasp of their intricacies is so fragile, we employ models, more or less explicitly, 
to help us ‘describe events, ascribe causality between events, impute motive or intention, 
discern meaning, and apply norms as standards of evaluation’.58 That is to say, we employ 
models to help make sense of real world constitutions. The explanatory framework supplied 
by a constitutional model involves an appeal to some idea or group of ideas; in the case of the 
model of a political constitution, as conceived by Tomkins and Bellamy, this appeal is largely 
to a republican ideal. The significance of such an appeal, whether to a republican or some 
other ideal, is that it enables us to adopt a critical stance with respect to the subject matter of 
analysis––here, the practices and institutions of a real world constitution. We are then 
equipped to understand and evaluate this subject matter from the perspective supplied by the 
model. But note that a constitutional model should never be wholly abstracted from that 
which it seeks to explain. After all, constitutional theory, properly conceived, ‘does not 
involve an inquiry into ideal forms’ but rather ‘must aim to identify the character of actually 
existing constitutional arrangements’.59 This ambition ought to resonate especially with those, 
like Griffith, who have sought to explicate existing constitutional practices. But of course, it is 
this very concern to ground the idea of a political constitution in ‘actually existing 
constitutional arrangements’ that has lead others to deride these same scholars as offering no 
more than an account of what happens. 
 
Doubtless, the explanatory framework supplied by a model will be idealized and 
stylized, but the discipline of thinking and talking in terms of a model is key because it opens 
up a critical space wherein there need not be some stark, all-encompassing choice in any 
given real world constitution between two (or more) models. For if we keep in mind that a 
model necessarily assumes some distance between the instance and the ideal, we are better 
placed to appreciate that any given example (a real world constitution) will not resonate in all 
respects with a given exemplar (a political or legal or some other model). In turn, this allows 
us to grasp the possibility that there might be more than one model informing a given real 
world constitution. Indeed, this is the key insight to result from talking and thinking in terms 
of constitutional models. For this insight can help us to appreciate that Britain’s constitution is 
                                                 
57 While the rubric of ‘models’ does not feature in Bellamy’s Political Constitutionalism, it is prominent in 
Tomkins’ Our Republican Constitution.  
58 Loughlin (n 3) 52. Loughlin does not talk in terms of constitutional models; that said, similar concerns 
underlie his interpretive approach and our account of the model of a political constitution.  
59 Ibid 186. 
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no longer—and likely never was—premised on any one constitutional model, whether this be 
a political or a legal or some other model. Rather, we are now better placed to recognize that 
Britain’s constitution today embraces, perhaps in uncertain ways and to an uncertain extent, 
both a political model and a legal model. 
 
Perhaps because neither a political constitution nor a legal constitution have been 
examined explicitly as constitutional models, what is often absent from most accounts of a 
real world constitution given by legal and political constitutionalists alike is an exploration 
(or, for that matter, even an acknowledgment) of how it can be true both that a real world 
constitution will embrace both models and that a political model and a legal model are, at 
least in some significant respects, at odds. Because political constitutionalists have, for the 
most part, proceeded to defend the model of a political constitution by way of a ‘challenge’ to 
the ‘common view’ of a legal constitution and the ‘unexamined and erroneous assumptions 
about the workings of democracy on which its rests’,60 they have tended to focus on the 
opposition between the two models, rather than on how they can both be incompletely 
realized within a real world constitution. For example, while Bellamy acknowledges that 
‘there are elements of both legal and political constitutionalism in most constitutions’,61 he 
offers an account which makes—or at least seems to make—an all-encompassing claim about 
the choice facing real world constitutions. For, on our reading, Bellamy does not regard it as 
normatively desirable that elements drawn from a legal model may in fact subsist within a 
real world constitution alongside elements drawn from a political model. Indeed, insofar as 
Bellamy presents his model of a political constitution as the original and true source of the 
republican norms of non-domination and political equality, it would appear that a constitution 
ought to remain unburdened by elements drawn from a legal model. In this, his treatment of 
the model of a political constitution makes it difficult to conceive of how it could subsist 
alongside the model of a legal constitution within a given real world constitution. It would 
seem, then, that on this reading of Bellamy, no real world constitution can embrace elements 
of both a political and a legal constitution, for what the one seeks to promote, the other 
distorts; what the one protects, the other undermines. In other words, it would seem that for 
Bellamy at least, there is a stark choice between either a legal constitution or a political 
constitution––but not both. 
 
Something similar might be said of Tomkins. Although he acknowledges that Britain’s 
constitution can be said to be ‘primarily’ (and by implication not exclusively) political rather 
than legal in character, and although alive to the dangers involved in any shift away from a 
political towards a legal model, Tomkins does not explain what it means to suggest that 
Britain’s constitution today embraces elements drawn from each model.62 This should not be 
taken to suggest that the presentation of stark alternatives is only active within political 
constitutionalist scholarship; legal constitutionalists appear as guilty of this indictment as their 
‘antagonists’. Irrespective of where the fault lies, it is by rejecting the view that the stark 
alternatives painted by certain political and legal constitutionalists must also play out in a real 
world constitution that one can, in turn, see how it can be true both that a political model and 
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a legal model are, at least in some significant respects, at odds and yet can be embraced by a 
real world constitution.  
 
The seeming contradiction between these two truths can be answered by recognizing the 
difference between the ideal and the instance that underpins and informs the notion of a 
constitutional model. To develop a more rounded sense of any real world constitution (such as 
Britain’s) almost inevitably involves an appeal to, amongst other things, both a political 
model and a legal model. With this in mind, it will come as little surprise to learn that a 
subsisting real world constitution, whether in Britain or elsewhere, will tend to embrace a 
political or legal or any model for that matter, in some, perhaps many, but likely never all 
respects. An all-encompassing claim that a real world constitution is ‘legal’ or ‘political’ can, 
on this view, be read as an exaggerated claim which agitates for the evolution of a real world 
constitution in one direction, rather than another. In most cases, and most obviously at a time 
of seemingly rapid constitutional change in Britain, these exaggerated, all-encompassing 
claims will not be accurate evaluations of a given real world constitution. This is not to say 
that it is never appropriate to employ an all-encompassing claim. Inasmuch as articulating 
unfashionable claims in encompassing terms can be an effective way of illuminating the 
shortcomings of conventional thought, there will likely always be some place for such claims. 
Yet, as Loughlin notes, where, as today, there is ‘renewed interest in investigating 
constitutional fundamentals, constitutional scholarship should not be converted into some 
adversarial contest’.63 In this light, it is perhaps truer to maintain that a real world constitution 
tends—albeit in different, challenging and at times contradictory ways—to embrace both of 
the models of a political and a legal constitution and that each model seeks to render explicit 
different facets of our constitutional self-understandings.  
 
6. Embracing the Political and the Legal 
 
While there is a noticeable tendency for political and legal constitutionalists to engage in all-
encompassing claims about the nature and content of Britain’s constitution, there are also, it 
must be said, a number of writers who acknowledge the constitution’s dual embrace of 
elements drawn from the model of a political constitution and its legal counterpart. Recently, 
some have begun to offer accounts of this dual embrace which seek to chart the ways in and 
degree to which the constitution draws on each of the two models. This is welcome. But 
whenever such an account is given, three propositions should be kept in mind. First, people 
will offer different understandings of what it means to talk of a specific real world 
constitution’s dual embrace of the legal and political models, with at least some of the 
differences between these understandings explicable by whether one is more inclined towards 
a political or legal (or some other) model in the first place. Proponents of a political model—
such as Bellamy and Tomkins—will likely offer understandings which differ in important 
respects from those favoured by proponents of a legal model—for example, Allan, Laws or 
Tom Hickman. For that matter, proponents of the different models will even differently 
envisage what is involved in offering an account of Britain’s dual embrace of the political and 
legal. Legal constitutionalists may envisage accounts of ‘politics under the constraints of legal 
order’.64 In turn, political constitutionalists may envisage law as politics by some other 
means. That differences may exist between how political and legal constitutionalists make 
sense of a real world constitution’s dual embrace of the political and the legal, and that one of 
these two models will tend to supply a dominant frame within which to accommodate 
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elements drawn from the other, is scarcely surprising. For when trying to make sense of a real 
world constitution’s dual embrace of both the political and the legal models, political and 
legal constitutionalists alike will tend to supply an account of the constitution that is itself 
shaped, more or less explicitly, in the image of their favoured model. 
 
Second, because people tend to perceive a real world constitution’s dual embrace of 
the political and the legal in ways shaped by their commitment to some model of the 
constitution, it will often prove difficult to offer an account which is thoroughly faithful to the 
basic claims of—or possibly even the animating spirit of—both constitutional models. Take 
Hickman’s essay in which he purports to offer an account of ‘the legal constitution plus 
political constitution, rather than the legal constitution versus political constitution’.65 
Hickman’s objective, as disclosed by the title of his article, ‘In Defence of the Legal 
Constitution’, is to defend the model of a legal constitution. Ultimately, for Hickman, the 
British constitution ought to be ‘understood as founded upon law that is enforceable in the 
courts’,66 and is thus essentially, or predominantly at least, understood by reference to the 
model of a legal constitution. He seeks, however, to mount a defence of (what he takes to be) 
Britain’s predominantly legal constitution that is sensitive to the fact that law ‘cannot provide 
answers to every question’, and that acknowledges that the courts ‘must always show due 
deference to the decisions and activities of the political institutions’.67 He is concerned, in 
particular, to demonstrate that Britain’s predominantly legal constitution encompasses the 
mechanisms of political accountability closely associated with the model of a political 
constitution. It is thus that Hickman points to a set of cases that, in his opinion, reveal the 
tendency of Britain’s legal constitution ‘to reinforce political methods of accountability’.68 By 
conceiving of the constitution ‘in terms of a harmonious and mutually reinforcing matrix of 
interacting, and frequently overlapping, remedial channels that together facilitate and control 
governance of the state’,69 Hickman offers a predominantly legal account of the British 
constitution which at the same time purports to take the model of a political constitution 
seriously. In this, Hickman attempts to plot a path between those legal constitutionalists who 
would suggest that ‘law should be always pushed forward, ever more intrusively into the fiery 
fields of party politics and popular morality as it goes’,70 as well as those political 
constitutionalists who would ‘insist on attacking the idea of the [legal] constitution itself’.71  
 
While we welcome Hickman’s recognition of the need to explore ‘the interface 
between the modern political and legal constitutions’,72 and while we find his suggestion that 
‘the legal and political constitutions [should be conceived] not as competitors, but as 
partners’73 an intriguing one, it is not clear to us that he succeeds in depicting Britain’s 
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constitution as an essentially legal constitution which, at the same time, takes the model of a 
political constitution seriously. For a start, Hickman’s account is premised on a narrow 
understanding of the model of a political constitution as one that helps to make sense of ‘a 
complex and vitally important set of structures of political accountability (such as the various 
ombudsmen, inspectorates, complaints procedures, auditors, and channels of ministerial 
responsibility, as well as many more)’.74 In this, he explicitly rejects the possibility that the 
model of a political constitution might serve as an important explanatory model in clarifying 
either the theoretical foundations of Britain’s constitution or the character of its prevailing 
institutions—and, in this, Hickman’s account comes close to making the sort of all-
encompassing claims that he purports to eschew. Indeed, given his narrow conception of a 
political constitution, it is unsurprising that at the same time as Hickman acknowledges that 
‘in terms of the day-to-day operation and regulation of government’, the model of a political 
constitution ‘is more important than its legal kin, and it should undoubtedly be at the forefront 
of constitutional scholarship’,75 he also suggests that, ‘more often than might be expected’, it 
is the legal model, rather than its political counterpart, ‘that hold[s] the solutions to matters of 
contemporary dispute’.76 
 
More importantly, perhaps, Hickman does not always seem to engage with the full 
force of the basic claims that underpin a political constitution. For example, he purports to 
address ‘the provisional nature of constitutional arrangements’, suggesting that ‘this feature of 
the constitution is perfectly consistent with liberal legalism, insofar as a liberal and legal 
constitution allows for the evolving nature of moral values and insists that legal norms are 
sufficiently open to accommodate and, indeed, inculcate shifts in moral consensus’.77 
However, for a political constitutionalist, the claim is not merely that the constitution should 
be viewed as provisional, in the sense of being subject to the possibility of change. There is a 
second, critical aspect to this claim: such constitutional change should occur through the 
ordinary political process that can best realize the republican norms of non-domination and 
political equality. It is not clear that Hickman’s ‘legal constitution plus political constitution’ 
attaches sufficient weight (or provides an adequate response) to this half of the political 
constitutionalist’s claim. Consequently, it seems that, at most, Hickman’s constitution is a 
legal constitution plus a pale imitation of a political constitution.  
 
The second proposition relevant to how a real world constitution embraces both the 
political and the legal thus suggests that it will often prove difficult to develop an account of a 
real world constitution’s dual embrace of the political and legal models that remains faithful 
to the basic claims and animating spirit of a political constitution and a legal constitution. 
Now, this difficulty doubtless draws on the reality that, even while there might be elements of 
each model within a real world constitution and even while many of those elements may be 
more or less compatible with each other, a political constitution and a legal constitution are 
incompatible—qua models—in important respects. For each model makes claims about the 
nature, content and workings of the constitution which cannot be fully reconciled with each 
other. It seems inevitable that whenever attempt is made to explain the dual embrace of the 
political and the legal models within a real world constitution, the resulting account will be 
one that does not, and in all likelihood never could, internalize the full extent of the conflict 
between the two models. To take a crude example, if a legal constitutionalist sought to temper 
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judicial review of legislation with an account of deference to Parliament, proponents of a 
political model might still have concerns that decisions taken by elected politicians were 
liable to being overturned by unelected judges. 
 
The third proposition relevant to the ways in which a real world constitution embraces 
both a legal model and a political model draws on the contingency of this dual embrace. 
Because both a legal and a political constitution can each be imagined in different ways, and 
because at times they prescribe conflicting arrangements even if they can be compatible in 
many other respects, their relationship within a real world constitution will itself always be 
contingent. This can be taken to be one (but not the only) reason why any assessment of the 
relationship between the model of a political constitution and the model of a legal constitution 
ought not to be starkly presented as either in tension or in harmony. It seems an over-
simplification to suggest, as Hickman does, that ‘[w]hat we require if we are to move forward 
is an account that presents the legal and political constitutions not as competitors but as 
partners’.78 Rather, it may be that the interface of a legal constitution and a political 
constitution is in fact messy, uncertain and contested—and perhaps for the same or similar 
reasons that animate a political constitution itself, this may be a good thing. For in 
contingency lies the potential to imagine things otherwise. Even though each of us will view a 
real world constitution in ways shaped by our favoured model, and even though it may prove 
difficult to offer an account faithful to the basic claims of other models, this ought not to stop 
us from offering accounts which identify new and interesting ways in which our favoured 
model makes sense of existing constitutional practices. Or differently put: the mere fact that 
we recognize that a real world constitution will embrace any one model of the constitution in 
some, but not all respects ought not to preclude us from searching out previously overlooked 
ways in which our favoured model casts light on the nature and content of some facet of that 
real world constitution.79 
 
This third proposition thus suggests, perhaps paradoxically, that recognizing that there is 
an ‘unreality’80 in categorizing a real world constitution as either entirely political or entirely 
legal ought to breathe new life into the political and legal models by encouraging the 
proponents of each to venture into unfamiliar territory and to uncover the relevance of their 
favoured model in elucidating some facet of constitutional arrangements and practice. This is 
significant. For there is, we suspect, scepticism amongst some of those who are aligned to 
neither the legal nor political models about whether either model can add much to our 
understanding of the modern British constitution. Tired of the seemingly stark choice between 
either a political constitution or a legal constitution, and weary of the all-encompassing claims 
which too often seem to underlie such a choice, some may quite reasonably question whether 
either model adds much to our understanding of a constitution which, today, seems to be 
neither distinctively legal nor distinctively political. However, it seems to us that both models 
are, in some respects, more critical than ever to making sense of the British constitution. By 
drawing both on the model of a political constitution and on that of a legal constitution, while 
of course recognizing that each is ultimately a highly stylized reading of the constitution 
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which will only be embraced in some but not all respects, it ought to be possible to uncover 
new and more interesting ways of speaking about Britain’s constitution today. There is, after 
all, a real sense in which some of the more pressing questions about the nature and content of 
the constitution are laid bare by the tensions that seem to exist between the two models. To be 
effective tools for understanding a constitution, however, the models and the contingent 
relationship between them must remain subject to constant re-imagining. 
 
7.    Conclusion 
 
We return to the question with which we began: what is a political constitution? In 
articulating our answer ‘a political constitution is . . .’, we have sought to reflect on what a 
political constitution purports to be. By moving beyond the descriptivism associated with 
Griffith’s political reading of Britain’s constitution, and by tracing the contours of a decisive 
normative turn evident in the scholarship of Tomkins and Bellamy, we have sought to present 
a political constitution as a normative constitutional model, even if its normativity is in 
important and inescapable ways indistinct and ill-defined. It is by conceiving of a political 
constitution in these terms that we come to appreciate the renewed relevance of the 
contingent, contested, and often times messy model of a political constitution even as 
Britain’s constitution is said to be slowly evolving away from a political model towards 
something more akin to a legal model of the constitution. 
 
The renewed relevance of the political constitution is grounded in the understanding 
that, qua model, it continues to speak to some, even if not all, aspects of the constitution. 
Much constitutional scholarship in Britain is focused on trying to cast light on the nature of 
constitutional arrangements. Yet, clearly, there is (and perhaps has long been) disagreement 
about how best to capture these arrangements. By thinking and speaking in terms of 
normative constitutional models, a political constitution and its legal counterpart present 
themselves as essential facets of our constitutional self-understandings, even as it becomes 
more difficult to claim that either model alone accounts for all aspects of Britain’s 
constitution. Indeed, it is precisely because there is such widespread and whole-hearted 
disagreement about the nature, content and workings of the constitution as a whole, and 
precisely because that disagreement runs so deep, that these two models—the legal and the 
political—can serve as such effective expressions of our constitutional self-understandings. 
The key is to remember that they remain models and that they can to do no more than render 
explicit self-understandings that are, in an important and perhaps inevitable sense, incomplete.  
 
While we have focused on the political constitution in this essay, we recognize that 
both the legal and the political models are at their most effective in rendering explicit our self-
understandings when taken alongside one another. For when our attention is so focused, we 
are called on to defend existing commitments or articulate the merits of proposed reforms as 
we seek, at the same time, to grapple with the presence of the other model within existing 
constitutional arrangements. By understanding the promise of thinking and talking about both 
models together, our answer to the question—what is a political constitution?—can be taken 
to sketch an answer to another question not explicitly posed in this essay, but nevertheless 
present throughout: ‘what is a legal constitution?’ 
